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Abstract: In this paper we study the development of the market for weather derivatives in 
Europe. We show that weather derivatives conceived as financial products by their promoters 
have difficulties finding end-users. We describe the attempts of market promoters using a 
framework drawn from economic sociology, namely the theory provided by Boltanski and 
Thevenot’s Economy of Worth. We derive some conclusions about the potential future of the 
market.  
 
In  his  visionary  conception  of  modern  society,  Ulrich  Beck  (1990,  1992,  2006) 
proposes to theorize modern societies as “societies of risk” and to explore the new paradigm 
thus created.  The notion of risk can accordingly be considered as a new epistemological and 
political  space  for  analyzing  changes  in  contemporary  capitalist  societies  (Calas,  1999; 
Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Ewald, 1991; Mandel, 1996). Although the social processes 
involved in the interpretation and definition of risks have been studied in many areas (for 
example, Lane and Quack, 1999, Gephart, 2001), they have been very little investigated on 
financial markets.  
To at least partially fill in this gap, we propose to focus in this paper on the European 
market for weather derivatives. Our main empirical interest is to understand why this market 
remains extremely thin, despite several attempts to develop it and repeated announcements of 
coming growth. Following Huault and Rainelli (2007), we argue that the shape of the market 
that results from their efforts can best be understood by taking full account of the specific 
features  of  weather  derivatives.  Combining  meteorology  and  finance,  weather  derivatives 
contracts are exchanged in Europe on the basis of over-the-counter markets and remain little 
standardized. More fundamentally, they involve various categories of actors belonging to the 
worlds  of  meteorology,  industry,  agriculture,  financial  markets,  insurance  and  banking 
companies. These different actors have distinct risk cultures. While traders from financial 
markets heavily rely on the financial theory of risk in the way they design weather derivatives   2 
contracts,  insurance  companies  are  more  used  to  actuarial  computing.  As  regards  non-
financial industries, they very much perceive weather risk as a kind of operational risk.  
Our thesis is that the main task of weather derivatives market promoters is to rally the 
various categories of actors around a unique conception of weather risk. We therefore propose 
to  analyze  the  heterogeneity  of  risk  cultures,  typical  of  the  market,  using  Boltanski  and 
Thevenot’s theory (1991/2006). Our main argument is that the various categories of actors 
evolve in different worlds and that the problem of market participants can be understood as 
one of finding a compromise between worlds in conflicts.  
 
Our paper evidences here is the relative failure of such an attempt. It provides some 
insight into the causes of this. When a financial innovation involves actors from very different 
worlds, it might be very difficult for the market promoters to find the compromise that would 
rally everybody around a common vision of risk. This suggests that there may be a limit to the 
marketization of new risks.  
 
  The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  divided  into  four  parts.  The  first  part  presents 
“Economies  of  worth”  as  a  conceptual  matrix,  to  focus  on  different  categories  of  actors 
evolving in different worlds and analyze the way they find an agreement. Against mainstream 
economic theory assumptions, and the idea that actors compete in a perfect and universal 
market on the basis of optimising rationality, this theoretical framework emphasizes complex 
operations  of  cultural  adjustments  and  evaluation,  to  face  economic  uncertainty  (Eulriet, 
2008). The second part presents our research method based on a longitudinal qualitative study 
of the emerging activity of weather derivatives from 1997 to 2007. Our approach focuses on 
how French actors took part in the development of the market. The third part consists of a 
presentation of our case study and of an analysis of our main results. The fourth, and last part, 
draws the principal conclusions of the research.  
 
   
 
1-   “Economies of worth” as a conceptual matrix 
 
In their book, On Justification. Economies of Worth, Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thevenot 
(1991/2006)  focus  upon  the  general  question  of  agreement.  They  underline  modes  of 
equivalence,  of  qualification,  of  adjustment  and  of  justification,  by  which  actors  produce   3 
agreements and coordinate their actions. They answer this question by taking full account of 






Common worlds  
 
In order for actors to reach agreement, the quality of things must have been defined, in 
a way that is consistent with the principles of worth invoked. The “worth is the way in which 
one expresses, embodies, understands, or represents other people” (2006 : 132). This leads to 
examine assemblages, including both persons and things that can be coherent ;  what the 
authors call worlds. These latter constitute bodies of rules that make it possible to build a 
harmonious polity, and shared competence required of persons in order for agreement to be 
possible. The order in a world can be described via categories defining subjects (the list of 
subjects), objects (the list of objects), qualifiers (state of worthiness), and relations designed 
by  verbs  (natural  relations  among  beings).  Higher  common  principle,  principle  of 
coordination that characterizes a world, is a convention for establishing equivalence among 
beings. This convention stabilizes and generalizes a form of association. People tend to make 
the higher common principle explicit only as a last resort in the process of justification.  
 
Drawing both on fieldwork observations of disputes and critiques, and on a reading of 
the classical literature in political philosophy, the authors distinguish a plurality of forms of 
evaluation or “grammar of worth” (Lamont and Thevenot, 2000 : 5) : 1/ inspiration expressed 
in creativity, spontaneity and originality 2/ domestic trustworthiness expressed in tradition 
and hierarchy, 3/ market performance, 4/ industry efficiency, 5/ renown based on fame and 6/ 
civic solidarity,. These last four worlds
1, kinds of ideal models of situations and relations, are 
explicitly depicted by Boltanski and Thevenot (1991/2006), as follows.   
 
The Market World. A person acting normally in this world, has not only to rely 
on  the  objectivity  of  the  good  to  reach  agreement  on  a  transaction,  but  also  on  its 
independence with respect to the various actors engaged in the transaction. Competition is the 
higher common principle and the circulation of goods and persons is free in a space that has 
no limits. “The Market World is thus populated with individuals seeking to satisfy desires ; 
                                                 
1 We describe more precisely the worlds that are directly linked to the main object of our research.    4 
they  are  in  turn  clients,  competitors,  buyers  and  sellers,  entering  into  relations  with  one 
another  as  businessmen”  (2006 :  198).  Actors  are  detached  from  one  another,  have  no 
personal relationships, and they take any opportunity to engage in a transaction. This latter 
supposes that the good is detached enough to allow the play of competition with others. “This 
distance has to produce indifference with regard to all the qualities that are foreign to those of 
buyer or seller in the persons with whom one is dealing” (2006: 202).  
 
The Industrial World. The higher common principle refers here to efficiency, 
to  performance  of  beings  and  to  their  productivity.  Action  is  a  task  of  production.  The 
harmony  of  this  world  is  expressed  in  the  organization  of  a  system,  that  is  to  say,  in  a 
structure in which things can be predictable. Test in this kind of organization supposes to 
check that things function as was predicted and that the solution to a problem is realistic. 
“Once the decision is made, the arrangement set up, the project launched, the mechanism 
started, its proper operation can be judged by an evaluation of its performance on the basis of 
the effects produced” (2006 : 261).  
 
 The World of Fame. It is opinion that establishes equivalence, and the worth of 
each being depends on the opinion of others. Persons have a common desire to be recognized 
and to be considered. The aim is to  attract  attention, to convince other people, to obtain 
respect  from  them,   “to  earn  or  win”  their  support.  (2006 :  180) ;  finally  to  capture  the 
attention  of  the  public.  The  peak  moments  are  those  during  which  some  images  become 
visible, for example during a presentation that places actors “in the spotlight under the gaze of 
others”. Beings achieve worth only if the presentation is made visible, in a transparent space 
where it can be looked at and compared. In the World of Fame, what is obvious is what is 
known, on the contrary what is unknown is debatable.  
 
 The Civic World. In this world, beings all belong to a collective that includes 
and  transcends  them.  They  escape  from  division,  and  access  to  worth,  because  they  are 
naturally political. They have a taste for what is common, what unites them. Judgement is the 
expression of the general will that may be manifested through the achievement of awareness, 
or by a collective reflection, or in the form of mobilization around a cause (2006 : 192). The 
general will is expressed by law. The polity comes apart when it yields to the particular. 
“Whatever dilutes, splinters or restrains is unworthy” (2006 : 193).  
   5 
 
Worlds in conflict and search for an agreement 
 
However, these worlds  are no closed systems.  One of the important dimension of 
Economies of worth resides in the following question: How are relations between different 
worlds established ? The answer to this question is that unlike objects, human beings can 
navigate in situations arising from different worlds. This leads to tensions, since the principles 
of justice invoked are not mechanically compatible. For example, from the point of view of 
the Market World, the  Industrial World can be criticized for its rigidities. The critique of the 
restraining effect of bureaucratic rules is particularly explicit (2006: 268). On the contrary, the 
Market  World  will  be  criticized  for  the  ambiguity  of  the  product  sold.  The  tensions  are 
particularly pregnant when it is time to make a deal and agree on a fair price. Sometimes, 
reference is made to the low degree of usefulness of a product if one considers its price.  
All these tensions between different worlds that generate disputes have to be solved if 
the  action  is  to  take  its  normal  course.  The  reduction  of  tensions  and  disaccords  can  be 
realized  through  compromising  but  also  through  other  figures  of  agreement,  such  as 
arrangements and relativization.  
 
The compromise represents the keystone of the  Economies of Growth  model.  It is an 
agreement  for  the  common  good.  In  a  compromise,  people  agree  to  suspend  a  clash  –  a 
dispute involving more than one world, without settling it through recourse to a test in just 
one  of  the  worlds  in  presence  (2006 :  277).  The  situation,  say  Boltanski  and  Thevenot, 
remains composite, but a clash is avoided. One way of establishing a compromise and to 
strenghthen it, is to place objects composed of elements stemming from different worlds at 
the  service  of  the  general  interest  to  give  them  their  own  identity  without  refering  to  a 
particular world. To work out a compromise consists also to reach the consensus, as regard 
the adequate term, “finding a formulation acceptable to all”.  
 
In  a  denunciation,  a  compromise  is  often  reduced  to  a  private  arrangement  that  only 
benefits the people involved. In this sense, the arrangement is a very contingent and local 
agreement. It is fragile and refers to a form of relativization. It is a sort of association oriented 
toward  private  interests.  “A  private  arrangement  is  a  contingent  agreement  between  two 
parties that refers to their mutual satisfaction rather than to a general good (you do this which 
is good for me ; I do that, which is good for you) (2006 : 336)”. The term private is used to   6 
focus on the absence of any  general interest. The arrangement escapes from any  kind of 
justification in relation to a polity.  
 
The analysis of the way people stop supporting a private arrangement leads Boltanski and 
Thevenot to identify another way of exiting from a dispute. It is a flight from justification, 
what they call relativization. To escape from a clash, people may agree that nothing really 
matters. Disagreement is not important if nothing matters. “In relativization, the reality test is 
abandoned in favor of a return to the circumstances (…). The relief that relativization brings 
depends precisely on the pacification that is procured by a return to relaxed situations in 
which  the  question  of  agreement  is  suspended”.  (2006 :  339).  Finally,  the  situation  is 
considered as purely local and with no consequences. Relativization is a way to escape testing 
and examination. But this very contingent situation leads to instability. No common measure  
exists and the polity falls apart.  
 
In the rest of this paper, we use the Economies of worth model as a matrix, to focus on 
different worlds in conflict on the market for weather risk, i.e different representations of 
weather risk. We also analyze the way actors try to reach an agreement, i.e the attempts to 
overcome conflicts between worlds.  
 
 
2-  Methods 
 
Our research is based on an in-depth qualitative study of the development of the market 
for weather risk from 1996 to 2008.  
 
Our objective is to understand the intentions and beliefs of the actors, their representation 
of  the  market,  their  arguments  and  their  own  interpretation.  Hence,  we  retain  the 
methodological position consisting of studying justifications in disputes, without “assuming 
the privilege of a bird’s eye view” (Boltanski and Thevenot, 2006 : 349). Besides, inductive 
logic remains rather dominant and can be assimilated to a naturalistic inquiry (Lincoln and 




Our approach focuses on how European actors took part in the development of the market 
and on their perceptions of weather risk. In a first stage, our objective was to offer a precise   7 
description  of  the  emergence  and  development  of  the  market,  in  order  to  improve  our 
understanding of our object. In a second stage, we tried to put forward the views and types of 
arguments the agents used when debating.  
To reach these objectives, the multiple sources of empirical evidence we used, can be 
divided into four main categories (Ravasi and Schultz, 2006 : 438). Although it covers a 12-
year period of development, our direct observation in the field lasted two years.  
 
Semi-structured  interviews.  We  conducted  a  total  of  20  interviews.  Our 
sampling logic moved from purposeful to theoretical (Locke, 2001; Ravesi an Schultz, 2006 : 
438). We initially interviewed people who could provide useful and general information on 
the market, its growth, its functioning, its main stakeholders and its operating routines. Our 
aim  was  also  to  identify  key  persons  for  subsequent  interviews.  Later,  we  theoretically 
selected our informants on the basis of our main research questions and interests. That is why 
we focused our attention not only on promoters of the market, but also on potential end-users, 
in order to deepen our understanding of disputes and agreements on this market. We selected 
interviewees  so  as  to  maximise  the  variety  of  profiles  and  heterogeneity  of  perspectives 
(Jacobides, 2005 : 471). Respondents are traders and promoters in banks and re-assurance 
companies  (Merill  Lynch,  Swiss  Re,  Paris  Re,  Scor,  Metnext,  Powernext),  end-users  in 
companies  stemming  from  different  industries  (tourism,  textile,  energy,  agriculture),  legal 
experts and economists in Paris and in London. More precisely, 10 interviews were conducted 
with promoters of the market, 3 with experts and 7 with end-users. Interviews were semi-
structured and focused upon five main questions areas : 1/ The goal of the market for the 
interviewee, 2/ His/her representation of the market, of its different stakeholders, of cultures 
of  risk ;  3/  His/her  opinion  as  regard  weather  risk  management ;    4/  The  most  important 
events s/he remembers as regard the development of the market ; 5/ The most significant or 
innovative products s/he used to manage weather risk ; 6/ The actions undertaken to deal with 
emerging problems and attempts to overcome conflicts.  
Interviews lasted between one and two and half an hour, most of them were tape-recorded 
and  transcribed.  Whenever  this  was  not  possible,  we  took  precise  field  notes.  All  the 
interviews involved the two researchers of the study, so as to minimize interviewer bias.  
  
Archival materials. Many categories of archival information such as the studies 
of  Deutsche  Bank,  the  Société  française  de  statistique,  the  Association  française  des   8 
trésoriers d’entreprises (AFTE), the Weather Risk Management Association (WRMA)
2, were 
consulted. These materials were used to confirm the main events on the market, to give details 
not available from interviews and also to provide textual accounts of debates and discussions. 
We also studied information, texts and discourses stemming from promoters’ websites such as 
WRMA and Metnext.  
 
Press  articles.  To  review  press  articles,  we  used  the  database  Factiva,  that 
provides business news collected from 14000 sources. In total, 250 articles were analyzed, 
beginning  with  research  on  the  key-words  :  “weather  risk”  and  “weather  derivatives”. 
Besides,  we  also  analyzed  systematically  the  articles  from  the  professional  magazine 
Environmental Finance. The database included issues of this magazine published from 1999 
to 2008. 198 articles about “weather risk” were reviewed. Through these documents, we were 
not only able to reconstitute events, but also to focus on the representations and discourses of 
different actors as regards the market for weather risk.   
 
Annual reports. We carefully analyzed annual reports of potential end-users from 
2006 to 2007. Our aim was to assess how these actors take weather risk into account in their 
external  communication,  and  to  better  understand  their  vision  and  their  logics  as  regard 
weather risk management.  
 
Finally, we also attended one professional seminar in March 2008, aiming at promoting 
the  market.  It  was  a  very  good  opportunity  to  observe  the  arguments  put  forward  by 
promoters  and  the  way  they  justify  the  legitimacy  of  the  market  and  their  actions.  This 
allowed also informal conversations with promoters (not counted as interviews).  
 
Table 1 : Main sources 
 
 
Sources  Objectives 
Interviews  First stage :  
-  Obtaining general information on the market 
-  Becoming familiar with the context 
-  Identifying actors for subsequent interviews 
Second stage 
-  Exploring perceptions, representations and arguments of actors and 
how they try to reach an agreement.  
 
Archival materials and websites  Confirming main events on the market 
                                                 
2  The  goal  of  WRMA,  or  Weather  Risk  Management  Association  is  to  serve  the  weather  risk  industry  by 
providing forums of discussion and information   9 
Giving textual accounts of debates and discussions 
Press articles (Factiva database 
and Environmental Finance) 
Reconstituting  main  steps  of  development  of  the  market  to  construct  a 
chronology 
Focusing on representations and discourses of actors 







Following  Miles  and  Huberman  (1994)  and  Yin  (1989),  we  arranged  the  data  into  a 
condensed, chronological account in order to produce a "facts database" of the development 
of  the  market.  In  a  second  stage,  we  tried  to  capture  the  “justificatory  accounts”  of  the 
different actors (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006: 32) and particularly of promoters trying to 
push the Market World.  
We first conducted a primary analysis of these accounts, first identifying sentences and 
words commonly used by actors to justify their activity. Using knowledge of the financial 
sphere, we identified an initial set of narratives, reviewed them carefully and interpreted the 
data using what we knew about the subject based on documents, press articles and interviews 
(Berg, 2004; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). We were then able to analyze diverse cultures 
of risk, different kinds of justification stemming from diverse actors, and different attempts to 
find an agreement on this particular market. More precisely and in relation with our research 
interest, we focused on four main themes: 1/ the absence of growth of the market 2/ the 
existence of different worlds, i.e. the different views and logics of actors as regard weather 
risk management, 3/ the emergence of disputes, i.e. of debates and discussions regarding the 
usefulness of weather derivatives 4/ the search for an agreement by promoters i.e the different 
attempts to overcome conflicts between worlds.  
 
As the research progressed, we sought to verify the emerging categories by using other 
data sources, in particular, professional press articles and annual reports. These data were 
collected after we had found the emerging themes from interviews and archival materials. It 
was then possible to verify the main actors of the market and their specific vocabulary. Based 
on this analysis, we observed that certain types of questions are more particularly put forward 




3. Case study 
   10 
The market for weather derivatives is usually considered to be born in 1997, with three 
noticeable transactions involving the firms Koch Industries, Enron and Willis
3. The principle 
of weather derivatives is to use weather variables such as temperatures or precipitations, as a 
basis for risk indices, allowing for the transfer of weather risk from a risk seller to a risk taker. 
For example, in a typical temperature transaction, if weather is too warm – e.g., the average 
temperature over a defined period exceeds a pre- agreed threshold-, the buyer is entitled to 
receive a payment from the seller, on the extent to which the average temperature exceeds the 
threshold
4. Weather risk can be expressed in terms of temperatures, precipitation, snowfall, 
wind or any other measurable variable. The amount of payment received by the buyer is 
determined according to his sensitivity to adverse change in weather. It is of interest to notice 
that risk can be transferred in the form of index-based insurances as well as through derivative 
transactions. In this paper we will focus on derivatives transactions, rather than insurances, 
because the former are at the core of the efforts of promoters to develop a financial market 
around weather risk. The advantage of using derivatives is that more stakeholders are allowed 
to  participate,  thus  increasing  the  chances  for  liquidity  to  develop  on  the  market,  a  key 
condition for a financial market to work efficiently
5. 
Although promoters insist on significant  growth of the weather derivatives market 
over the recent past years, the market remains noticeably thin and seems to encounter various 
difficulties in taking off. In this case study we present some market data. We then analyse the 
various approaches of weather risk borne by would-be participant of the market and relate 
them  to  the  worlds  described  by  Boltanski  and  Thevenot.  Identifying  conflicts  between 
worlds  around  the  notion  of  weather  risk,  we  finally  study  the  way  market  participants 
attempt  to  overcome  these  conflicts,  and  the  problems  weather  derivatives  promoters  are 
faced with in their effort to develop the market.  
3.1 The market for weather derivatives 
The market for weather derivatives began with a few private transactions involving a 
transfer of weather risk between private counterparties. It then developed along the two lines 
usually  followed  by  financial  innovations.  First,  a  market  for  standardized  contracts  was 
                                                 
3 WRMA Website 
4 WRMA Website. 
5 For more on the intricate question of the difference in legal qualification between insurance and derivatives, see 
Huault & Rainelli (2007).   11 
created on the CME
6 in 1999. Euronext attempted to launch a similar market on London’s 
LIFFE in 2001, meeting however no success: the weather contracts had to be withdrawn from 
the market in 2003, due to a lack in transactions. A timid attempt to give it a second chance is 
reflected by the creation in May 2007 of MetNext, a Euronext-Nyse and Meteo France joint 
venture,  which  aim  is  to  provide  weather  indices  that  could  be  used  in  tailoring  weather 
derivatives. 
The European market for weather derivatives then developed according to the second 
line often followed by financial innovations and today only involves customized contracts 
exchanged on an over the counter  (OTC) basis. 
Weather derivatives are rather simple financial instruments and come into the guise or 
futures,  swaps  and  options.  Contracts  over  temperature  dominate  the  market.  The  total 
number of contracts (futures and options on futures) offered on the CME amounts to 27. 18 
are based on weather data in US cities, 9 on weather data in European cities, such as Rome 
Barcelona, Essen, Paris or London
7. Being customized, contracts exchanged on the over the 
counter European market can take various forms. Paris Re for example describes a double 
trigger option to hedge French vineyard exposure to frost and excess rainfall. The option will 
trigger if one or both of the two weather indexes involved exceed a pre-agreed threshold, 
offering the wine producer a payout, computed as a linear function of both indices.
8 
The  evolution  of  the  market  has  been  measured  by  a  yearly  survey  conducted  by  Price 
Waterhouse Coopers for the WRMA (Weather Risk Management Association), the industry 
association, since 2001. The last available data are summarized in the following chart. 
Chart  1.  Total  Notional  Value  of  weather  risk  contracts:  2000/1-2005/6 




                                                 
6 Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
7 For a detailed example see Appendix 1. 






















The total value of trades reported in the 2005/6 survey is $45.2 billion, compared to $9.7 
billion in the 2004/5 survey, with the CME experiencing significant increases in both the 
number of trades and the value of those trades. The survey also shows that High Degree 
Days
9 remains the most common type of trade. The increase on the standardized market was 
somewhat offset by declines in the OTC market, which remains very thin. With slightly over 
$2.5 billion dollars, the OTC weather derivatives market represent almost nothing of the $ 
414,290 billion of total notional amount of OTC derivatives exchanged worldwide in 2006
10. 
The  number  of  OTC  trades  reported  by  survey  participants  was  2,180  in  the  2005/2006s 
survey, as opposed to 4,057 the year before.  
We should also note that the WRMA website does not communicate any figures for 
years 2006/2007, a sign that could reasonably be interpreted as meaning decrease for the 
market over the very last years. 
 
Two  further  remarks  might  be  added  to  the  brief  description  of  the  market  just 
provided. The first one is related to the fact that although futures are traded on weather, there 
exists no spot market for this very specific “commodity”. Weather can not be exchanged in 
itself; the market for weather derivatives is therefore what financial theory calls incomplete. 
This induces a greater uncertainty on the price of weather derivatives, since the traditional 
methodology of arbitrage, which involves using the derivatives as a hedge for the spot, can 
not  be  used.  The  theoretical  value  of  futures  or  option  contracts  remains  thus  somewhat 
problematic. 
Secondly, the extension of the financial theory of risk to the management of weather 
risk is not straightforward. Orthodox theory, as set by the famous work of Modigliani and 
Miller,  poses  that  risk  such  as  interest  rate  risk  and  foreign  exchange  risk  should  not  be 
                                                 
9 HDD (Heating Degree day) contracts are based on the number of temperature degrees within a given period 
below 18,33° C 
10 Source BIS statistics   13 
hedged  by  firms  themselves,  since  shareholders  can  offset  these  risks  with  no  cost  by 
diversifying  their  portfolios.  However,  various  theoretical  and  empirical  researches  have 
given grounds to the observed empirical fact that firms do manage their foreign exchange and 
interest rate risk. Some authors at least partly justify the practice by considerations related to 
the  cost  of  financial  distress  or  the  need  to  smooth  the  evolution  of  earnings  to  remain 
powerful in the face of competitors. As weather risk is in some cases directly linked to the 
very operations of some firms, the idea that they might hedge what can be considered as part 
of their business risk is problematic in the point of view of financial theory. Shareholders 
might be willing to take that risk and add it to their portfolio for diversification purposes. 
They might not see favourably firms transferring this risk to financial intermediaries. Some 
weather market participants thus advocate that only those firms which are exposed to weather 
risk but not in their core activities, hedge for that risk
11. 
 
Now that we have a better view of what the market for weather derivatives looks like, 
let us turn to the representations of actual and potential market participants as regards weather 
risk and the way it ought to be managed. 
 
 
3.2 Different representations of weather risk 
 
Weather is an old concern of humanity and one of the interests of our case study is to show 
how the proposal to manage weather risk through financial markets impacts with pre existing 
representations of various market participants as regards weather risk and the way it can or 
must be managed. 
 
What « the market » ought to be: the view of promoters 
 
The  WRMA  (Weather  Risk  Management  Association)  was  founded  in  1999  by 
leading participants in the weather market as the “industry association for the weather risk 
management business”. Its website provides an accurate source of information to understand 
what it is exactly that promoters of a market for weather risk are fostering. In the chapter 
devoted  to  the  history  of  the  market,  the  WRMA  website  editor  notes  that  the  idea  of 
                                                 
11 Marteau et al, 2004   14 
transferring weather risk had been the subject of insurance as well as power supply or gas 
utility management considerations for some time.  He however observes that prior to 1997, 
and contrary to the current situation, none of these early initiatives “developed into a market”. 
We hence learn that the whished-for market is one that “manages risk in ways compatible 
with both financial and insurance markets” and “comprises a primary and secondary market 
in weather risk”. It does so by providing index based risk transfer per measurable weather 
variables  (temperature,  precipitation,  …)  and  transferring  risk  on  the  basis  or  aggregate 
measures (e.g. total precipitation in a period, total degree days in a period), frequency of 
incidence (e.g. days with maximum temperature less than 32ºF in a period) or adverse event 
(e.g. rainfall greater than 0.50 cm on the day of finals at Wimbledon). The risk traders on this 
market  manage  risk  “dynamically  according  to  disciplines  adapted  from  commodity  and 
financial trading”. There is a “constellation of market makers and market participants” which 
“offers  the  weather  market  greater  depth,  breadth  and  financial  security  than  ever”. 
Particularly emphasized is the fact that the place of energy traders, which were at the core of 
the market at its beginning, has “now be taken by insurers, banks and hedge funds and by 
trading on exchanges, pre-eminently on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange”, and that “its 
numbers include several of the strongest financial institutions on the globe”.   
 
For weather risk to be successfully exchanged according to the traditional feature of a 
financial risk, depth of the market is crucial. It is depth that provides liquidity, a necessary 
feature for a financial market to remain attractive and develop. The existence of a secondary 
market of weather risk in addition to the primary market is a key condition to foster liquidity. 
The variety of participants in the market is another one:   
   
“Emerging from a period in which the market was dominated by energy business, the 
market  is  spreading  to  encompass  a  variety  of  sectors,  including  agriculture, 
construction, transportation and entertainment. In the last three years the exchange 
trading of weather risk, often in conjunction with commodity and energy risk, has 
mushroomed  and  has  attained  a  level  of  critical  mass  on  the  CME.  The  weather 
market has emerged as an important contributor to the management of risk in a wide 
variety of businesses and areas of government responsibility”. (WRMA website) 
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According to the view of market promoters, turning the idea of weather risk transfer 
into a market clearly amounts to framing weather risk into a financial risk. In other words, 
into a risk that can be dealt with using financial technologies and will seem of interest to 
financial  institutions.  Elsewhere  on  the  website  weather  risk  trading  is  presented  as  “an 
attractive business opportunity because weather essentially is uncorrelated with secular or 
systemic risk in general financial markets and provides an opportunity for diversification for 
traders”. This argument is typically targeted for financiers who, since Markowitz’s proposed 
his famous portfolio theory, have diversification as their first commandment. Following the 
same vein, weather is presented as a risk that “can be traded in ways that are common to 
trading  generally”,  the  argument  being  articulated  in  the  vocabulary  that  is  familiar  to 
financiers: “weather has volatility
12, the tails of weather risk may move differently from at-
the-money positions, correlations between weather in different areas converge and diverge, 
etc”  (…)  portfolios  of  weather  risk  can  be  managed  by  most  of  the  approaches  used  in 
managing portfolios of security and commodity risk: including ratio tests, Greek parameters 
and Value at Risk measures”.  
 
Firms and weather risk 
 
Although according to  promoters, weather derivatives offer features of interest for 
various industries, the view of industrial firms in Europe reveals by and large indifference to 
the concept. A recent study conducted in France, Belgium and Luxembourg in 2006 on 53 
companies chosen for the intensity of their risk management activities (Bertrand, 2007) shows 
that 47% of the enterprises from the sample considered weather risk to have a negligible 
impact on their economic performances. Only 21% of the firms studied have attempted to 
assess precisely this impact. One and only one out of the 53 had put in place a weather risk 
management strategy involving however no financial instruments, while two others said they 
might consider doing so.  
 
The difficulty of appreciating the exact impact of weather risk on sales is one of the 
primary  reasons  mentioned  by  companies  for  not  developing  any  interest  in  weather 
derivatives.  Vivarte,  a  textile  group,  reckons  having  been  contacted  by  its  reinsurance 
                                                 
12 The emphasis on the volatility of weather is one of the prime argument of promoters, as can be seen for 
example, in the presentation made by Didier Marteau for AON, in Paris in March 2008, in the book from the 
same author (Marteau et al., 2004) or on the WRMA and MetNext Websites.    16 
company regarding the possibility of using weather derivatives. They declined, on the basis of 
rather  ambivalent  considerations  on  their  exposure  to  weather  risk.  Although  weather 
conditions are at the top of the day-to-day consideration of the local shops, the precise risk 
seems too difficult to measure:   
 
“They are so many other factors, such as the economic conditions, which are more 
important than weather. OK, weather is important on a day to day basis, but, in and 
all, bad weather does not last the whole season, and we catch up a bad week through 
a better one”. (General Manager) 
 
Beyond limited impact on results, other reasons often offered by companies to explain 
why they do not hedge against weather risk using derivatives are the price of hedging which 
they  generally  consider  to  be  too  expensive.  For  example,  in  2003,  the  ski  manufacturer 
Rossignol  said  the  company  was  unable  to  find  any  “economically  sound  solution  to 
externalize weather risk” on the market. Compagnie des Alpes, a French ski lift operator, 
terminated  its  weather  derivatives  contract  two  years  in  advance,  on  the  ground  that  the 
premium was too expensive for the protection it offered. 
 
For the firms that are most conscious of their exposure to weather risk, operational 
management of weather risk and activity diversification are deemed to be good alternative to 
the use of derivatives. They seem closer to the core competencies of the firm and far less 
expensive. “We will come to weather derivatives if the market develops” says Philippe Huet 
from EDF, a company which weather exposure is particularly obvious ( ….) “We look at the 
available physical resources before considering to resort to some insurance contract (…) We 
rather  use  the  agreements  we  have  with  some  of  our  customers,  be  they  industrial  or 
individuals, which allows us to stop providing energy if we need to”. The Compagnie des 
Alpes, which early reckoned its exposure to high temperature during winter, has first adapted 
its ski resorts. Eric Guilpart, its spokesman says:  
 
“Thanks to the work we do on the trails in winter but also in summer, skiers can enjoy 
their favourite sport on snow layers no thicker as 10 cm, where 70 cm were necessary 
a few years ago. We have reoriented some trails, so that the sun will not melt the snow 
too rapidly (…) Our shareholders use to ask us questions about the way we managed   17 
weather  risks:  our  geographical  as  well  as  activity  diversification  has  reassured 
them”.  
 
Electrabel, a Belgian provider of electricity has no activity on the market which it 
deems not important for its activities at present. Were the climate to change rather drastically, 
for example as experts of global warming forecast, then the people in Vivarte think they will 
adapt by managing their textile collections differently. 
 
 A discrepancy between two worlds 
 
Overall, weather risk appears to be apprehended in a different manner by promoters of 
a market for weather derivatives and industrial firms. But these differences in views would 
remain  unproblematic,  were  it  not  for  promoters  of  the  market,  who  want  to  change  the 
situation and rally other actors  and especially industrial firms around their conception.  A 
market for weather derivatives can only develop if there are, facing financial institutions, who 
act  as  direct  or  intermediary  risk  takers,  people  who  seek  risk  protection.  The  need  for 
counterparties  is  also  a  need  for  variety,  since  risk  will  be  more  easily  shared  if  some 
industries need to hedge say against hot weather, while others fear cold weather. Convincing 
industrial firms is thus a crucial issue to promoters of the market. It is in this effort, and in the 
difficulties it meets that we can best recognize a situation that has been described at length by 
Boltanski and Thevenot. The need to convince other parties makes it necessary for promoters 
of the market to engage in justification efforts. The arguments developed by industrial firms 
confronted to that offer also provide extremely relevant information. Overall, what we face is 
a discrepancy between the views of two categories of actors on a same object, weather risk; 
we feel we can usefully characterize this discrepancy as a conflict between two worlds. The 
problem of promoters of a weather risk market is to succeed in drawing weather risk into the 
Market  World.  The  crucial  point  here,  as  Boltanski  and  Thevenot  underlines  in  their 
description of the Market World, is for weather derivatives to be objectively defined and as 
independent as possible of the personal characteristic of the buyer and seller. This conditions 
liquidity, eg the ability to resale the derivatives on a secondary market, which is crucial to the 
development of a financial market.  On the other hand, companies tend to frame weather risk 
in close relation with their specific business and define its relevance to them in terms of 
operational considerations. When they do it at all, they tend to manage weather risk resorting   18 
to tools closely linked to their “savoir faire” and view proposals from the financial companies 
as too expensive, or “not sound”.  This can be related to Boltanski and Thevenot description 
of  the  Industrial  World,  where  “action  is  a  task  of  production”  and  the  higher  common 
principle  refers  to  efficiency,  performance  and  productivity.  The  kind  of  solution  thus 
designed by industrial firm foster firm specific responses to weather risks which are at odds 
with the minimum standardization required to develop a financial market for weather risk 
management instruments, with a secondary as well as a primary segment, both sufficiently 
liquid and deep for the market to remain attractive.   
   But although we can identify a conflict between the Market World and the Industrial 
World with respect to weather risk management, no dispute in Boltanski and Thevenot’s sense 
really  arise.  What  we  see  is  an  attempt  of  market  promoters  to  frame  weather  risk 
management in a sense that would make the high common principle of the Market World 
eventually prevail. What they meet is mainly indifference. They resent this lack of success 
and mainly account for it by accusing industrial companies of lacking appropriate risk culture 
or in other words, evidencing culture backwardation.  
« Firms are used to hedge against interest risk or foreign exchange risk. They use 
sophisticated instruments to do so, and in the  same time, they do nothing against 
weather risk, which is of foremost importance. This difference in approaches is truly 
surprising. (…) How long will it take before firms realize that weather risk exists, and 
that it must be assessed and hedged ? (Re-insurer) 
« To be able to manage the risk, you need first to assess it. Assess…I think 99% of the 
firms simply do not assess it. They would say, oh, yes, we have weather risk (…) (Re-
insurer)  
“I was told : you are crazy. Only Americans do this kind of things, it will never work 
in France”. (Weather index provider) 
“It is like asking people who have their habits…you know an old couple, 50 years of 
marriage, to change their habits of Sunday morning. Not to go to mass, or not to go 
shopping”  (Metnext) 
“ One learns at school, one is used to manage risk…interest rate risk for example. You 
learn at school and you know how to do it. You have models that are operational, you 
are  used  to  it…and  suddenly,  there  is  a  new  risk,  weather  risk.  And  it  bothers   19 
everybody. Except that weather risk can sink a firm. Except that weather risk, is often 
more important than …many other risks. (Metnext) 
 
 
This  type  of  arguments  very  often  put  forward  by  our  interviewees,  reflect  their 
difficulty in entering into actual disputes, the reaching of an agreement being much more of 
an  issue  for  promoters  of  the  market  than  for  industrial  firms.  Lamenting  about  culture 
backwardation of industrial firms is however not the only solution left to promoters. In what 
follows, we examine how they try to involve other worlds than the market and  Industrial 
Worlds into the debate and how they face the demand of the  Industrial World as regards 
weather  risk  management.  We  attempt  to  characterize  the  situation  in  the  terms  of 
compromising but also arrangements and relativization proposed by Boltanski and Thevenot. 
 
3.3 Attempting to overcome the conflict between worlds  
  
In an attempt to respond to what they perceive to be the need of industrial firms, promoters 
of the weather derivatives market enter into imaginative designs for the type of product they 
propose.  Several  of  our  interviewees,  give  the  following  description  of  “products  of  the 
future”.  
 
“I think this is very interesting to develop linked products, for example on carbon and 
wind and gas that link the variables together. I find it extremely interesting. I think the 
product must not be considered alone. It has to be seen using a global approach, I think 
that is this direction which is the most promising “(Expert) 
 
In the same vein, an often mentioned selling argument can be found for example in the 
documentation provided by a re insurer: 
“As for product example, large travel agencies could buy bad weather protection which 
will pay out a % of travel arrangement package for every rainy day within the vacation 
period. A rainy day will be defined as 4 or more of consecutive rainy hours between 10:00 
and 18:00 hour, a rainy hour implying 2 or more millimetres of rainfall during the 1 hour. 
This could allow the travel agency to sell a marketing package to its client, hedging them 
from bad weather by using itself a weather derivative.” This selling argument has practical 
implications as the example of Michelin’s marketing campaign for winter tyres shows. From   20 
the 1
st November to the 20
th December 2005, through its “mild winter guarantee”, Michelin 
offered the buyers of four winter tyres a €50 credit, receivable only if the average temperature 
of the area they lived in remained over 7°C during the winter.  
 
What we see in these examples is the attempt by promoters to overcome the lack of 
interest of firms by proposing finely tuned weather derivatives that would closely match the 
specific  exposure  or  strategy  of  the  targeted  firm.  This  can  be  interpreted  as  extreme 
adaptation  of  weather  derivatives  promoters  to  the  needs  of  industrial  firms,  or  in  our 
theoretical  framework  as  an  attempt  to  reach  agreements  between  the  Market  World  of 
promoters  and  the  Industrial  World  of  the  firms  they  try  to  involve  in  the  market.  Such 
agreements can be characterized as a “private arrangement”, in Boltanski and Thevenot’s 
sense: they remain local, contingent and difficult to generalize. The Industrial World with its 
need for specificity, and operational efficiency seems to be the one which dictate the term of 
the  agreements  against  the  interest  of  the  Market  World:  the  weather  derivatives  thus 
generated could difficultly be exchanged on an anonymous secondary financial market, the 
chances  of  finding  counterparty  with  opposite  specific  needs  being  unlikely.  Overall,  the 
efforts to develop financial product that would mirror marketing products used by industrial 
firms to attract customers, emphasize the effort of promoters to enter in the  Industrial World 
of  their  would-be  clients.  To  a  great  extent,  this  is  done  at  the  cost  of  abandoning  the 
objective of creating a liquid financial market for weather derivatives. 
 
To  advance  the  development  of  the  market,  promoters  of  weather  derivatives  also 
resort to arguments borrowed from two other worlds, alien to both the industrial and the 
Market World, namely the World of Fame and the Civic World. 
Most of our interviewees belonging to the promoters’ category seem to put their faith 
in the interest showed by the press for weather derivatives and in the potential positive impact 
on the general public debate about climate change on the development of the market.  
 
« The press is very fond of the topic. They deadly want to make reports on it. I am 
literally harassed by the main TV channels about it” (Re-insurer) 
« I think it is important to say that weather derivatives are extremely sexy products. 
People love to talk about them. They could talk about them during hours”(Weather 
index provider)    21 
« There are many people like you, who come to visit us at the moment. We see many 
students. Many do dissertations on the weather derivatives market, they are looking 
for information or for the names of some informants”(Metnext) 
“Well, the price of energies is increasing and the climate is becoming more and more 
erratic. Actors’ awareness is increasing consequently. Some people have begun to 
realize that climate could have an impact on their results. And thus that something had 
to be done, that something could be done. Some actors that were not present on the 
market have begun to come to it.” (Re-insurer) 
« Truly, with what happens in the world as regards climate, weather derivatives are 
certainly trendy. Everybody speaks of them. Look, I brought you this, the magazine 
Challenge of this morning. See “hot and cold (coup de chaud et coup de froid) », firms 
tell what they have to go through. For example Go Sport, who underwent a terrible 
month of April due to weather conditions” (Weather index provider) 
« …Awareness is increasing everywhere. Especially in firms. But also at individual 
level  and  at  government  level.  At  all  levels,  awareness  increases  as  regards  the 
enormous  impact  of  meteorology  on  economy.  Look  at  the  rights  to  pollute,  the 
Grenelle  de  l’environnement
13,  which  is  getting  prepared.  Everything  hinges  on 
environment and climate change. And firms are readier and readier to take that step » 
(Metnext) 
« It is perhaps optimistic, but one feels that this context, you see, climate change, the 
need to adapt, all this creates a real buzz around, you know, weather risk. » (Expert) 
 
Drawing from Boltanski and Thevenot, we can interpret these elements of justification 
as attempts to rise above the conflict between the industrial and Market Worlds by using 
arguments of both the World of Fame, and the Civic World, in order to promote the relevance 
of weather derivatives. In the World of Fame, the aim is to attract attention, to capture the 
attention of the public, a situation that promoters of the market seem to deem attainable in the 
case of weather derivatives, due to the interest they raise among journalists. It is thus of 
importance to strike deals which will come “in the spotlight”, and promoters of the market 
often complain on the lack of publicity that industrial firms are ready to give to the few deals 
they strike. The fact that EDF has refused to publicize a deal made with the courtier Gras 
                                                 
13  A  French  government  initiative  to  make  all  stakeholders  contribute  to  the  definition  of  a  policy  for 
environment protection.   22 
Savoye to hedge its aerial installations from storm risk over the period 2003-2008 has been 
strongly resented by market promoters. Commenting on EDF’s refusal to be cited in the press 
release published by CDC Ixis over the issuance of a CatBond following this operation, Jean 
Carle, at the time head of weather derivatives at Meteo France, states: 
 
“There are a lot of firms who contact us. Surprisingly however, almost all of them 
have us sign confidentiality agreements, or ask us not to communicate over their interest
14.” 
The higher common principle of the Civic World can conversely be perceived in the 
mobilization  of  arguments  related  to  global  warming.  The  idea  that  the  problem  will  hit 
everybody and necessitates widespread awareness can be linked to the fact that in the Civic 
World, “beings all belong to a collective that includes and transcends them”. Promoters seem 
to put their faith, at least partly to the notion that  “the general will may be manifested through 
the achievement of awareness, or by a collective reflection, or in the form of  mobilization 
around a cause” (Boltanski and Thevenot, 2006 : 192).  
 
The Civic World is finally mobilized, however differently, in one of the peak moments 
of  the  market  often  quoted  by  promoters.    A  particularly  striking  deal  on  the  weather 
derivatives market seem to have been  the deal signed by Axa re, now Paris Re ,and the World 
Food Program, the former replying on an call for tender of the latter in 2006. The idea was to 
help Ethiopia hedge the risk of drought affecting its crops.  
 
 “What we have done is the first charity oriented weather derivative; we dealt with the 
World Food Program. The idea was to cover all Ethiopia, the totality of the crops in 
Ethiopia, to avoid famine. In case of famine, we would have sent money to Ethiopia, to 
provide help. The product was to look at all the climatic zones in Ethiopia, then construct 
an index based on the quantity of rain in each zone, which of course is correlated with 
crop yields all over the country. The contract is very, very complex. There are about 30 or 
35 weather stations, the contract is really complex. And then according to the index, we 
pay or we don’t pay. The money is sent to the WFP, before the end of the crop, before the 
beginning of the famine. This is preventive aid instead of emergency aid.” (Re-insurer) 
 
                                                 
14 It must also be acknowledged that this argument can also be used to hide the thinness of the market and 
pretend it is larger than is actually the case.   23 
The higher common principle of the Civic World, that is general interest, is clearly put 
forward in favour of this deal: 
 
“(…) disaster occurs, the media step in, people die in direct live on TV, and the money 
flows all at once. But emergency help is five times as expensive as preventive help (…) and 
less efficient. (…) The best way is to strike a deal, a weather derivative deal that allows 
money to arrive on time.” (Re-insurer) 
 
What we observe in these examples is how promoters see the interest of general public 
opinion for weather changes, with its potential impact on rich as well as poor countries, as a 
potential driver for the market they attempt to develop. Their attempt to use higher common 
principles from worlds alien to the industrial and Market  World  can be interpreted as  an 
attempt to transcend the conflict between these two worlds and seems to be based on the 
vague hope that this might make the principles of the Market World eventually prevail, which 
of course, remains the ultimate goal of market promoters. The kind of situation produced 
however instead of paving the way for the building of a compromise, seem rather to create 
what  Boltanski  and  Thevenot  call  composite  setups,  which  in  the  Economies  of  Worth, 
precede and sometimes trigger the disputes
15.  
For example, the interest of the press is interpreted as producing negative outcomes by 
some of our interviewees. It glosses over the topic, which they feel contradicts and harms the 
seriousness required to design sound financial deals. They fear that the publicity given to 
weather  derivatives  might  deprive  these  instruments  of  the  touch  of  seriousness  other 
financial  products  display  and  will  eventually  keep  them  from  successfully  entering  the 
rational and highly technical world of finance. An even clearer illustration is given by the Axa 
Re –World Food Program deal which odd and somewhat awkward use of the principles of the 
Civic World into the Market World is resented by one of its main actor and promoter as 
follows:  
 
“Of  course  there  was  a  question  about:  « it  is  possible  to  use  a  financial  product  to 
develop aid and relief, while, in the same time, in a way, enriching the financial risk takers?”. 
                                                 
15 Composite setups are situations where people are made uncomfortable because they bring together things 
from different worlds in a very ambiguous manner. Different solutions seem equally likely and there is strong 
uncertainty over the state of mind of the people involved and over the worlds they refer to.   24 
But (...) overall, we have had little negative comments, none from the journalists anyway.” 
(Re-insurer) 
 
If  our  interpretation  of  some  of  these  situations  as  composite  setups  in  Boltanski  and 
Thevenot’s  sense  is  correct,  then  they  will  probably  provide  not  help  very  much  in 
overcoming the conflict between the industrial and Market World. Rather, they will call for 
clarification in one of the world they involve. Can it be the Market World? One could of 
course hope that the interest of the press will trigger the interest of would-be clients from the 
Industrial World, thus offsetting the negative effect described above. However, this has not 
been the case until now. The potential driving effect of the World Food Program deal seems 
even more dubious. The agreement remains highly contingent and local. It was signed as a 
response to a tender offer from the WFP. Although other such deals might see the light, they 
will remain private arrangements and are likely to reflect very much the demands from the 
tendering International Organizations.  It is difficult to see how they could significantly foster 
the  financial  market  for  more  usual  weather  derivatives.  Lastly,  the  idea  that  weather 
derivatives are going to provide a significant solution to issues produced by global warming 
seems a little abusive. Market promoters themselves tend to exhibit agnosticism as regards 
their own use of the argument. Many of them underline moreover that too much of global 
warming might not foster the trade of weather derivatives, which like all financial instrument 
require opposite anticipations to make sense. They insist on the fact that weather derivatives 
will  win  more  from  increased  weather  volatility  due  to  climate  change  than  from  global 
warming itself.  
 
Overall, what we show is that market promoters are currently forced to enter into various 
strategies to overcome the conflict between the Market World they want weather derivatives 
to be framed in and the Industrial World. Their attempts to construct agreements with the 
Industrial  World  lead  them  to  strike  finely  tuned  contracts,  matching  the  operational 
specificities of the firms they deal with. This results in their endorsing the world of their 
would-be clients, thus at least temporarily abandoning their initial objective of creating  a 
liquid financial market for weather derivatives. Resorting to the higher common principles of 
the fame or Civic World has not proven of a great help up to now. It seems to have created 
composite setups in Boltanski’s and Thevenot sense, which call for clarification in one of the 
world  involved.  It  is  difficult  to  see  how  such  processes  could  significantly  foster  the   25 
development of a market for weather derivatives. The marketization of weather risk finally 







Using the framework proposed by Boltanski and Thevenot, we observe that weather 
risk is not apprehended by all market participants in the same way. We document the various 
efforts made by the promoters to rally industrial firm to their conception and promote the 
market by different means. Practically however, what they face seems to be low demand, 
which they tend to overcome by offering extremely fine tuned products, adapted to the very 
particular needs of the customer they target. Although the customizing of financial products is 
quite natural on OTC financial markets, we believe that in the case of weather derivatives, 
this extreme adaptation to customer’s needs provides far reaching insights into the general 
question of risk marketization. In his detailed descriptions of various auctions market, Smith 
(1989) proposes to explain the market structures he observes by seeing them as answers to the 
ambiguities market actors have to alleviate to be able to do transactions. Following this thesis, 
we advocate the interpretation of our observations of the market we study can be greatly 
enhanced by taking into account the problem of ambiguities confronting market participants, 
which, in the case of weather derivatives, stem from the specific features of weather risk. 
From one firm to another, weather risk is associated with weather events related to different 
variables, which include, besides temperature, rainfall, snow, wind, sunlight, storms and all 
possible combinations of those. These weather events can be extremely localized, both in 
space and time. For example, the impact of a risk of  lack of snow for a given ski-lift operator 
will vary greatly from one spot to another, one week to another depending on which are 
holydays weeks, and might also combine with additional weather variables such as wind or 
sun. As a result, ambiguities are strong on the measurement of weather risk, and also on its 
potential  impact  on  would-be  risk  sellers’  operations.  Therefore  industrial  firms  respond 
either by choosing to ignore weather risk, on the ground its impact is too difficult to measure, 
or by demanding products that closely match what they perceive to be their operations at risk. 
Promoters are then forced to adapt and offer products fitted to the specific industry of the 
buyer, the type of weather variables that impact its operations, the time of the year when   26 
weather  risk  is  considered  and  the  very  precise  locus  at  risk.  While  the  first  reaction  of 
industrial firms to perceived ambiguities, which consist in just ignoring the problem, is of 
course not favourable to the development of a weather derivatives market, the second one 
does not prevent such a development, provided the market offers tailor-made products to 
customers. However, the theory of Boltanski and Thevenot helps us see that such a market 
will very difficultly match the type of markets targeted by current weather derivatives market 
promoters; it will very difficultly take the shape of a financial market. The reason why this is 
so is because the answers given by market participants to the ambiguities they perceive on 
weather risk are in contradiction with the very principles of the Market World.  The products 
exchanged, instead of being independent with respect to the actors involved in the transaction, 
are closely related to the operations of the risk sellers, who act as buyers of the contracts. Due 
to  the  need  to  finely  adjust  to  the  demand  of  customers  and  the  lack  of  liquidity  of  the 
resulting  contracts,  competition  between  promoters  is  somewhat  restrained  and  can  not 
develop on a wide geographical space.  Transactions involve personalized relationship, and 
the sought-for distance of the Market World is not easily attained. Overall, our analysis shows 
that the contradiction between the observed market structure and the principles of the Market 
World might be difficult to overcome.  As a result, the possibility of developing a successful 
financial market for weather derivatives could remain remote. The observed thinness, lack of 
standardization and absence of liquidity of the market despite several attempts over the last 12 
years do not appear to be temporary problems. 
 
In summary, according to Boltanski and Thevenot’s paradigm, we observe that, in 
contradiction to the higher common principle of the Market World, the weather derivatives 
exchanged on the European OTC market is far from resembling the anonymous, liquid and 
fast developing market its promoters targeted. We interpret this result as a consequence of the 
specificity of weather risk, which appears difficult to disembedd from the Industrial World 
and therefore not quite cut out for marketization. More generally, when a financial innovation 
involves actors from very different worlds, it might prove extremely difficult for the market 
promoters to find the necessary compromise that would rally everybody around a common 
vision of risk. This suggests that there may be a limit to the extension of the financial theory 
to  the  objectification  (LiPuma  and  Lee,  2005)  and  marketization  of  new  risks.  It  can  be 
expected that attempts at having CAT-bonds, risks of attack or rights to pollute exchanged in 
financial markets could also meet difficulties. According to Beck (1990: 61), risks might be 
seen  as  “the  interminable  needs  sought  by  economists”,  because  needs  that  are  open  to   27 
interpretation can be proliferated endlessly (Beck, 1992, 2006). In this paper, we show that 
the  interpretation  provided  by  the  financial  theory  of  risk  might  have  more  limited 
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